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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IRENE PAUL and CHARLES J. PAUL, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
WOODROW LAWRENCE KIRKENDALL, JOHN 
DOE, JANE DOE AND JOHN DOE, COMPANY, 
Defendants, 
and 
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation 
Garnishee and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order de-
nying Appellant's motion for summary judgment, which 
order was entered by the Second District Court for 
Weber County, Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge, 
presiding. Plaintiffs in the court below will be here 
referred to as such, the defendant Kirkendall as the 
defendant, and the Appellant Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, as the Garnishee. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein recovered a judg-
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ment entered upon a jury verdict against defendant 
Kirkendall in the sum of Twenty Thousand ( $20,000.00) 
Dollars, for personal injuries arising out of an automo-
bile accident. This judgment was affirmed on appeal 
to this court 1 U. 2nd 1; 261 P. 2nd 670 
Garnishee, the Appellant herein, as defendant's in-
surance carrier, paid said judgment up to the limits of 
its policy coverage of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dol-
lars, together with interest. 
Plaintiffs, after 'execution returned unsatisfied, 
sued out a writ of garnishment with interrogatories, 
which was served on appellant, ~Iaryland Casualty Com-
pany, as Garnishee. It was therein asked, among other 
things, if Garnishee was indebted to defendant. The 
answer was negative. Plaintiff then replied to the 
Answers alleging that Garnishee was indebted in the 
amount of the excess judgment, based upon the as-
sertion affirmatively pleaded in plaintiffs' second reply, 
in substance, that Garnishee negligently and in bad 
faith failed to settle the case within the policy limits 
before trial, after having an opportunity to do so. 
Upon the issues fran1ed by interrogatories and 
reply, both sides moved for sum1nary judgment, which 
motions were taken under advise1nent by the Court at 
pre-trial. Various memorandun1s and affidavits were 
filed by both parties. On June 25, 1956, the lower court 
'entered its order denying both motions, holding that 
garnishment was an available re1nedy under our rules 
for plaintiffs to pursue, and that the issues of bad 
faith and negligence could be litigated therein without 
the presence of the defendant• under plaintiffs' theory 
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that appellant held the excess sum for their use and 
benefit as a chose in action of the defendants. The 
court set a trial date for the determination of the issues. 
This appeal was then taken from that order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Subsequent considerations have prompted us not 
to include in the brief certain of the points set out in 
the petition for an appeal. W'e feel, however, that the 
points herein contained are meritorious and will properly 
sustain our position. 
It is Appellant's contention that the lower court in 
denying its motion for summary judgment erred for 
the following reasons : 
I. 
THE ALLEGED CLAIM HERE SOUGHT TO 
BE GARNISHED SOUNDS IN TORT AND AS 
A MATTER OF LAW IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
GARNISHMENT. 
II. 
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
RULE THE ALLEGED CLAIM IS NOT SUB-
JECT TO GARNISHMENT, SINCE IT IS NOT 
IN THE POSSESSION OR IN THE CONTROL 
OF A THIRD PERSON. 
III. 
THE RELATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT 
AND GARNISHEE HEREIN IS NOT THAT 
OF DEBTOR TO CREDITOR, AND THE 
RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTING, IF ANY, 
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CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS A DEBT 
WITHIN THE LANGUAGE OF RULE 64 (D), 
U.R.C.P. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ALLEGED CLAIM HERE SOUGHT r_ro 
BE GARNISHED SOUNDS IN TORT AND AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, IS NOT SrBJECT TO 
GARNISHMENT. 
The claim ltere sought to be garnished is the chose 
in action alleged to exist in behalf of the defendant 
Kirkendall against the Garnishee, for negligently and 
in bad faith refusing to settle within the policy limits 
before trial. The defendant has never asserted such 
claim. If it is capable of being asserted, it seems with-
out argument that such a claim sounds in tort. It was 
argued extensively by Respondent below, and undoubt-
edly will be argued as extensively here, that the alleged 
claim of defendant sounds in contract under the insur-
ance policy, as well as in tort for breach of the duties 
arising under such contract. According to our research, 
this position is not sustained by the authorities. See 
131 A.L.R. 1500, supplementing 71 A.L.R. 1485. The 
cases therein cited hold that where an insurer in a 
liability policy reserves the exclusive right to contest 
or settle any claim against the insured, and prohibits 
him from voluntarily assuming any liability for settling 
any claims without the insurer's consent, except at his 
own cost, (the policy herein involved being substantially 
standard in these respects), there is i1uposed upon the 
insurer no contract obligation, either express or ilnplied, 
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to compromise or settle, and from this it follows that 
notwithstanding the insurer's failure or refusal to com-
promise or settle within the policy limits, no action in 
assumpsit or on the contract will lie against it for any 
amount that a judgment recovered against the insured 
is in excess of the policy limits. Liability, if any, rests 
in tort. In Zumwalt vs. Utilities Insurance Company, 
Missouri, 228 8. W. 2d 750, which was an action to re-
cover an excess judgment based upon the claim that the 
the Company negligently and in bad faith refused to 
settle, th'e Court said at Page 756: 
"This action is a tort action. It is not an action 
to recover 'any loss under a policy' of insurance. 
It is true it grew out of a contract, a policy of 
insurance. No action on a contract will be against 
an insurance company for that part of a judg-
ment recovered against the insured which is in 
excess of th'e policy limit. See 131 A.L.R. 1500 
and cases therein reviewed." 
If the claim sounds in tort therefore, it is subject 
to the general rule that such claims are not subject to 
garnishment within the purview of statutes generally 
in force today. 38 C.J.S. 296; 93 A.L.R. 1088 et seq. 
We call attention to the case of Black vs Plumb, 
Colorado, 29 Pac. 2nd 708, 91 A.L.R. 1334, and the anno-
tation following at Page 1338. These cases are noted 
to be illustrative of the general rule that a mere liability 
on the part of the Garnishee to an action by the principal 
defendant for conversion of the property of the defend-
ant, will not serve as the basis of a judgment in favor 
of the property owner's creditor against the garnishee, 
such liability being for an unliquidated tort claim. In 
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the Black case the Colorado statute provided only for 
the garnishment of a credit, debt or chose in action. 
Black was an offieer of the defendant corporation 
against whom the plaintiff recovered a judgment. It 
appeared that Black had sold the use of a list of stock-
holders of the debtor corporation, thereby converting 
it, and the plaintiff by garnishment sought to reach the 
proce'eds of the sale. The Supreme Court in reversing 
the judgment of the lower court, held that the Garnishee 
should have been discharged, since the claim of the 
debtor corporation was for conversion, a tort, was un-
liquidated, and did not fall \vithin the scope of the 
statute. In view of the statute, one must necessarily 
read this decision as holding that choses in action for 
purposes of garnishment must be those arising ex con-
tractu. 
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Brena,u College 
vs. Mincey, 61 8. E. 2nd 301, held 
"It is well settled law in this State that defendant 
in a tort action is not subject to garnishn1ent until 
the tort claim is reduced to judgment." 
Citing Bates and Company cs Forsyth, 69 Georgia 
365 (2), to the effect: 
"That although one 1nay have the right to bring 
a tort action against another, the tort feasor is 
not subject to garnishment at the instance of a 
creditor of the injured party." 
And further : 
"Garnishees are required to answer as to indeb-
tedness and as to assets or property in hand, 
not as to the torts they 1nay have com1nitted 
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against the defendant in a suit." 
The Suprerne Court of Montana in Coty vs Cogs-
well, 50 Pac. 2d 249, under its attachment statute (credits, 
personal property or debts), held that a chose in action 
for personal injury was not property within the purview 
of the statute, since it was an unliquidated claim for 
damages in tort, and therefore not subject to attach-
ment. S'ee also Arp vs Blake (Cal.) 218 P. 773; Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v Nakano (Cal.) 87 P. 2d 700, 121 
A.L.R. 417; Lewis v. Barnett (Kan.) 33 P. 2nd 331, and 
the discusssion in McNeilly v. Furman (Del.) 95 A. 2d 
267, 35 A.L.R. 2d 1436. 
These cases are collected in the notes and supplement in 
38 C.J.S. 296 under Garnishment - Claims Ex Delicto. 
E,ven if it were determined that the alleged claim 
here involved were dual in nature, giving the person 
aggrieved, the right to waive the tort and sue under 
the contract, the cases we have been able to find on the 
subject nevertheless hold that the creditor of the wronged 
person is not at liberty to exercise this option in order 
to defeat the principle prohibiting the garnishment of 
unliquidated tort claims. 91 A.L.R. 1339, 93 A.L.R. 
1088. 
POINT II. 
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
RULE THE ALLEGED CLAIM IS NOT SUB-
JECT TO GARNISHMENT SINCE IT IS NOT 
IN THE POSSESSION OR IN THE CONTROL 
OF A THIRD PERSON. 
The rule involved, 64 (d) (a), U.R.C.P., insofar 
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as material here, provides as follows : 
"The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of 
the complaint, may have a writ of garnishment 
isssue, and attach the credits, effects, debts, 
choses in action, money, and other personal prop-
erty of the defendant in the possession or in the 
control of any third person, as garnishee, whether 
the same are due at the time of the service of 
the writ or are to become due thereafter; • * *." 
The claim here, if in fact one exists, is one belong-
ing to and in the possession or control of the defend-
ant himself, and is not held by any third person. It is 
or would be a claim by Kirkendall against the Appellant 
based upon negligence or bad faith, if any there might 
have been. 
Mortimer vs Young, California, 127 Pac. 2d 950, 
was a case applying similar language under the Cali-
fornia statute as it existed at that ti1ne. It involved 
levy by execution on a cause of action for fraud. It was 
held that a levy on property not capable of manual 
delivery, other than a debt, is to be n1ade by giving notice 
to the person having such property "in his possession 
or under his control'', that person being i·n the case of a 
cause of action the plaintiff who is s1u~ng on it. 
In Bassett vs McCarty, JT"'ashington, 101 Pac. 2d 
575, the garnishment statute provided that the garnishee 
shall appear and answer as to what personal property 
or effects of the defendant he has in his possession or 
under his control. The plaintiff comn1enced an action 
against the defendant to recover for Inoney lent and 
subsequently he sought to garnish a verdict the defend· 
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ant had obtained against a third person. This verdict 
was bas'ed upon a cause of action for tort., but had not 
yet been reduced to judgment. The court in affirming 
the dissolution of the writ of garnishment, held as fol-
lows during the course of the opinion at page 579: 
"Appellant, however, contends that a verdict 
constituted 'property', and for that reason is 
subject to garnishment. Rem. Ref. Stat. Sec. 683, 
on which appellant relies in this connection, re-
fers to 'personal prop'erty or effects, if any, of 
the defendant', which the garnishee 'has in his 
possession or under his control, or had when such 
writ was served.' (Italics ours) 
"Conceding that a claim against the garnishee 
constitutes property of th'e claimant, it clearly is 
not in the possession, or under the control of, 
the garnishee defendant. As stated before, the 
question before us is not what constitutes a legal 
basis for the issuance of a writ of garnishment, 
but specifically, what is subject to garnishment." 
See also Cunningham v. Baker (Ala.) 16 So. 68, 
which was decided under a garnishment statute embrac-
ing, among other things, money or effects in the possess-
ion or under the control of a third person. The Gar-
nishee held money and effects of the defendant which 
were acquired tortiously. The Court said at Page 71: 
"It would be a diversion of a garnishment from 
its real office and purposes if it were employed 
to redress torts committed against the debtor, 
and to reach and subject moneys or effects the 
poss'ession of which is not held in his right, but 
is held adversely and in hostility to him." 
We submit, accordingly, that defendant Kirkendall's 
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claim or cause of action against Appellant, if any he 
had, was not a chose in action "in the possession or in 
the control" of appellant and therefore was not subject 
to garnishment. 
POINT III 
THE RELATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT 
AND GARNISHEE HEREIN IS XOT THAT 
OF DEBTOR TO CREDITOR, AND THE 
RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTING, IF ANY, 
CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS A DEBT 
WITHIN THE LANGUAGE OF RULE 64 (D), 
U.R.C.P. 
Plaintiffs, in their answer to Garnishee's petition 
for intermediate appeal, and also in their reply to ans-
wers of Garnishee, assert that Garnishee is "indebted" 
to defendant within the meaning of Rule 64 (d) U.R.C.P. 
In this connection, it should be noted that Rule 64 (D) 
(a), in outlining what property may be attached by a 
Writ of Garnishment, uses the words "debts". The 
word "indebted" is used later in Rule 64 (D) (a), in 
connection with the requirement of the affidavit for a 
writ to issue prior to judgn1ent. Therefore, the word 
"indebted" has no bearing in the present question, and 
the word "debts" as used in this rule is controlling. 
To deter1nine if the alleged right of action existing 
between defendant and Garnishee is a "debt", it is neces-
sary to know its exact nature. 
The duty·claimed to Jwye be'en breached by garnishee 
was (if such a duty is found to exist) a duty in1posed 
by law rather than a duty in1posed by contract or agree-
ment of the parties. 
In this regard, the provision of the contract of 
10 
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insurance here involved is as follows : 
"As respects the insurance afforded by the other 
terms of this policy under coverages (a) and 
(b), the Company shall: 
(a) Defend any suit against the insured alleging 
such injury, sickness, diseas'e or destruction and 
seeking damages on account thereof, even if such 
suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the 
company may make such investigation, negotia-
tion and settlement of any claim or suit as it 
deems expedient;" 
Under this provision, the Company had the right 
or option to make a settlement with plaintiffs, but no 
duty to so do. If any duty to settle did exist, it arose, 
not by provisions of this contract, but was imposed by 
law from the relation of insurer-insured. 
The case of City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity 
Co. (Mich .1929), 225 N.W. 643, is similar in point. 
There the insured brought suit against the insurer in 
tort to recover an excess judgment rendered against 
the insured, upon t:h'e theories (a) negligent defense of 
the suit, (b) negligent failure to settle, (c) bad faith 
in refusing to settle. While holding that Insurer could 
be held liable only on ground (c), the Court said : 
"The courts se'em to be unanimous in the opinion, 
as expressed by direct ruling, recognition, or 
assumption, that the insurer is liable to the in-
sured for an excess of judgment over the face 
of the policy when the insurer, having exclusive 
control of settlement, fraudulently or in bad faith 
refuses to compromise a claim for an amount 
within the policy limit. They are also unanirnous 
11 
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that the instant form of policy contains no express 
or implied contract obligation of the insurer to 
compromise claims, and that an action in assump-
sit or on the contract will not lie for the excess 
of judgment over policy limit. Where the propo-
sition is stated, the great weight of authority 
holds that the insurer has the option to compro-
mise but no obligation to do so. The exclusive 
control of settlement in the insurer, however, 
applies only to the policy limit, as the insured 
may compromise his own possible liabilitv in 
excess of that amount. General Accident, Fire & 
Life Assurance Corporation v. Louisville Home 
Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S.W. 1031, L.R.A. 
1917 D 952; Pickett 1.i. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 
60 S.C. 477, 38 S. E. 160, 629." 
In the case of Best Building Co. vs Employer's Lia-
bility Assurance Corp. et al, 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911, 
the insured sued the insurer for alleged negligence in 
failure to s'ettle the claim within the policy limits. While 
holding the insured to be liable only for bad faith, not 
negligence, the Court said: 
"The question is directly raised whether under 
the terms of these accident policies as they now 
read the insurance con1pany is liable for negli-
gence in failing to settle a case when there was 
a possibility of so doing. That the insurance 
company in the handling of the litigation or in 
failing to settle is liable for its fraud or bad 
faith is conceded and has been repeatedly stated 
in all the cases bearing on the subject. So also 
it has been held by this court that the company 
is not liable on its contract for a failure to settle; 
a contract iluposes upon it no such duty, A uber-
bach v J.laryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 
12 
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N.E. 577, 28 A.L.R. 1294; Streat Coal Co. v Frank-
fort General Ins. Co., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E. 352. 
In the latter case this court said: 'Defendant, 
however, was privileged at its own cost to settle 
any claim or suit. It was not obligated so to do, 
neither was it required to consult plaintiff in re-
gard thereto ... In the absence of fraud, negli-
gence or bad faith, alleged and established it is 
not the duty of the court to read into contracts 
conditions or limitations which the parties have 
not assumed' . . . " 
The cases above cited hold with the majority of 
American courts that the only duty insurer owes insured 
in regard to settlement is the duty of good faith. A 
minority of courts hold that in addition to the good 
faith requirement, the insurer may b'e held liable to 
insured if it negligently refuses to settle plaintiff's claim 
within the policy limits. This question has never been 
decided in this jurisdiction. 
However, it does not matter which approach is taken, 
because both the "good faith" and "negligence" rules 
are founded solely upon a breach of duty implied by 
law, not imposed by contract. 
Tlre case of Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, 
Accident & Plate Glass Insurance Co. (1917, CA 1st 
Mass. 240 F. 573, is on'e of the leading cases adopting 
the "negligence" theory. Therein the court said, on 
petition for rehearing: 
"The defendant's duty to the plaintiff, as set out 
in the first and second counts of the declaration, 
does not depend upon whether it did or did not 
obligate itself in the policy to prepare and defend 
13 
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the Hodele suit, or to settle the same. As pointed 
out in our opinion handed down in this case on 
February 27, 1917, the plaintiff's right of action 
in the first count, is based upon the ground that 
def·endant entered upon the preparation and de-
fense of the suit, and in the second count that 
it entered upon the task of settling it, and that 
in each case it was negligent in what it under-
took to do. As each count sounds in tort, and is 
based upon a duty imposed by la-w, it is wholly 
immaterial whether the defendant was or was not 
under a contractual duty to prepare and defend 
the suit or to settle the same." 
It may be urged by plaintiffs that since the original 
relation between Garnishee and defendant is contract-
ual, defendant is entitled to waive the tort and sue in 
contract for the breach thereof. We submit that such 
a result can not be reached because the cause of action 
is based solely on tort, as pointed out hereinbefore. 
Even if defendant in this instance could waive the 
tort and sue in contract, such an option is entirely per-
sonal, and does not extend to the plaintiff. 
In the case of Black v. Plumb, supra, the court said: 
"A clain1 in tort, not reduced the judgn1ent, is 
not a debt within the meaning of the statutes in 
reference to garnish1nent. • • • The rule is the 
same where as between the tort-feasor and the 
person to whon1 the wrong was done the latter 
might at his option either hold the tort-feasor 
to his liability in tort, or, waiving the tort, treat 
him as his debtor, since. the creditor of the 
wronged person is not at liberty to exercise this 
option in his place, and so evade the general 
rule as to garnish1nent of clailns in tort, sub-
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'J::, 
stituting thereafter a liquidated claim quasi ex 
contractu." 
Lewis v. Dubose, 29 Ala. 219, 38 C.J.S. Garnish-
ment Sec. 91, Page 296, 4 Am. J ur. Attachment and 
garnishment, Sec. 206 and 207. 
In discussing "debt" as pertaining to garnish-
ment statutes, the Supreme Court of Alabama said in 
Station Nat. Bank of Decatur at Oneonta v. Towns, 62 
So. 2nd 606, at Page 607: 
"An indebtedness from a garnishee to a judg-
ment debtor subject to garnishment is such debt 
as will sustain an action of assumpsit by the 
judgment debtor. Coosa Land Co. v. Stradford, 
224 Ala. 511, 140 So. 582; Pettus v. Dudley Bar 
Co., 218 Ala. 163, 118 So. 153." 
Again, in the case of Hollis v. Bender, 40 So. 2nd 
876, the Supreme Court of Alabama held: 
"With reference to the instant case, if at the time 
of the service of the garnishment, or at the time 
of making the answer, or at any time intervening 
between these dates, tlre garnishee was not in-
debted to the defendant, York, or if there was 
not then existing a valid and binding contract 
under the terms of which such indebtedn'ess would 
accrue in the future, then there was no debt sub-
ject to garnishment. The right thus arising must 
have been such demand as would support an 
action of debt or indebitatus at the instance of 
the debtor. Archer v. Peoples Saving Bank, 88 
Ala. 249, 7 So. 53; Henry v. Murphy & Co. 54 
Ala. 246; Nicrosi v. Irving, 102 Ala. 648, 15 So. 
429, 48 Am. St. Rep. 92; Feore v. Miss. Transp. 
Co., 161 Ala. 567, 49 So. 871; Pettus v. Dudley 
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Bar Co., 218 Ala. 163, 118 So. 153; Coosa Land 
Co. v. Stradford, 224 Ala. 511, 140 So. 582; Sloss 
v. Glaze, supra; Allen v. Woodruff, 2 Ala. App. 
415, 56 So. 247 .. 
"Writing on the subject, Chief Justice Stone 
observed in Teague, Barnett & Co. v. Legrand, 
85 Ala. 493, 5 So. 287, 7 Am. St. Rep. 64: 'True, 
the debt need not be due and presently demand-
able; but there must be a contract, express or 
implied, out of which a money liability will ~er­
tainly spring in the usual course of things. :Many 
contracts from which money liability may pos-
sibly arise are not subject to garnishment at 
law.' " 
The case dealt with a situation where garnishee let 
defendant take garnishee's hogs, fatten them, and upon 
sale defendant was to receive on'e-half the weight in-
crease. The Court said there was no debt to sustain 
garnishment. 
Also standing for this interpretation is Tucker r. 
Ware (Okla.) 37 P. 2d 625. 
Th'e Garnishee herein respectfully submits that 
the claim existing, if any there be, between defendant 
and garnishee, is a tort claim for drunages which could 
not sustain an action of 'debt' or 'indebitatus assump-
sit,' and therefore is not a 'debt' within the meaning 
of Rule 64D, U. R. C. P. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the remedy of garnishment 
cannot have been intended to allow adjudication of a 
purely, alleged, tort claim of the defendant against the 
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garnishee, the liability for which is expressly denied, 
in proceedings solely between garnishor and garnishee. 
Such a theory perverts the very purpose of this pro-
visional remedy which historically has been strictly 
confined to contract obligations. 
The claim here involved is clearly not a debt within 
the purview of garnishment. It further cannot be the 
subject of garnishment, since it is held, not by a third 
person, but by the defendant himself, if in fact it exists. 
The order of the lower court should be reversed 
and the writ dissolved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys for Garnishee and Appellant 
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